Thus the Hippocratic Oath-by which members of the medical profession, at least in the West, still consider themselves bound-states the principle of confidentiality. As it stands, however, the Hippocratic statement is essentially empty. It binds doctors not to divulge what "ought not to be spoken of abroad" on the strength of the tautology that what ought not to be spoken of abroad "should be kept secret." But it offers no guidance as to what sort of information a doctor is or is not obliged to keep secret, under what circumstances, and from whom. Nor does it tell us who is entitled to decide, in any specific case, whether or not a given item of information can be divulged to a third party, including another doctor or health care worker, and in particular (and of special relevance to the topic of this paper) when the patient should be given power of veto over any such disclosure. The General Medical Council has listed a number of exceptions to the rule of confidentiality, mainly situations in which doctors are permitted to break the rule without the patient's consent. ' We shall be better placed to consider the issue of whether it is acceptable to edit medical records when we have first briefly explored the moral basis of confidentiality in medicine.
Two distinct values seem to be at the heart of the principle of confidentiality, one specific to the medical context and the other not. The value not specific to medicine is that of respect for people's privacy. It student who had suffered a psychotic breakdown during her Oxford career but had nevertheless successfully completed her course. She came to see her doctor after getting her degree to say goodbye and to ask that all mention of the episode should be removed from her records, including hospital letters. She did not want future doctors to label or prejudge her. Another instance was that ofa 27 year old male student who was HIV positive and who asked his doctor (AM) to remove all mention of this fact from his records when he was due to leave college. "I gave you that information," he insisted, "not every Tom, Dick, and Harry." A third, hypothetical case (put to ML by a retired general practitioner), is that of a woman whose husband's "sexual shenanigans" are referred to in this woman's records as a possible explanation ofsymptoms that her doctor was inclined to regard as psychosomatic. It would be only natural for the woman to be concerned, when she moved, that not only her own but her husband's personal affairs would become known to her new general practitioner. It seems to us that in each of these situations a case may be argued for acceding to the patient's wishes.
There are two principles at stake here. The first is that respect for the patient's privacy and autonomy requires that the doctor's disclosure of personal information be sensitive to the intentions and legitimate expectations of the patient. These intentions and expectations will extend both to who is to receive the information and to what it is to be used for. (Thus, it clearly raises ethical problems when a doctor, in connection with an insurance application, is asked to give information that is possibly detrimental to the patient and that was disclosed by the patient for the sole purpose of assisting treatment or diagnosis.)
The second principle is that the patient should not be deprived of the ability to information is put to and to whom it is revealedalways assuming, of course, that no one else's welfare is at stake here. Even if the records, as physical objects, are government property it does not follow that this is true also of the information that they contain. Personal information disclosed in a consultation should perhaps be seen as effectively "on trust" to the doctor for the period of treatment, or for the period in which that doctor continues to have the person as a patient. (The whole issue of ownership of information is one that would merit more attention from moral philosophers.)
Other arguments of a more pragmatic character will no doubt be advanced in favour of maintaining the status quo. One should be reluctant, it may be said, to advocate any new system that would add to the administrative burden under which hard pressed general practitioners and the NHS generally, currently labour. Some sacrifice of patient autonomy may be justified on the basis that it is a relatively small price to pay in return for the very great benefits of the present system, which allows the use of information collected over a long time to be used whenever required in a consultation. But even in therapeutic terms there could be much to be gained by a system that gave patients greater control over their own records; it might well serve to encourage greater openness, enhanced trust, and a greater spirit of cooperation between doctor and patient. We find it difficult to believe that a system more respectful of confidentiality and of the patient's wishes could not be made to work successfully if there was a sufficient will so to do. Despite the reassurance of these reports, similarities in the modes of transmission of hepatitis B virus and HIV and the evidence of transmission during dental surgery suggest that perioperative infection will occur, although it is uncertain how often. HIV infection has a long latency so that cases of AIDS appear a long time after surgery and will be more difficult to relate to a surgical event than acute hepatitis associated with hepatitis B virus.'2 There are currently no virological markers for the likelihood of transmission from individual health workers infected with HIV. 17 Epidemiological requirements
The need for data to assess the risk of HIV infection to health care workers has never been questioned yet the same systematic approach has not been adopted for patients. The 
